Iran will elect a new Parliament along with the fifth “Assembly of Experts” on Friday, February 25.
The Parliamentary elections occur every four years, and 290 representatives are elected. Five seats are reserved for minorities (Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians and Armenians). There are over 6,000 candidates vying for the 290 seats. If no one clears a 33% threshold, a second round is held with the two top performing candidates (or multiples of two in districts that elect multiple seats). Successful candidates will join the Islamic Consultative Assembly for a four year term and can begin writing or re-writing laws. 8% of the current parliamentarians are women and 10% of the candidates in this year’s election are women.
But in this cycle, the election for the Assembly of Experts is much more important. This 86 member body consists of senior theologians/clerics serving an eight-year term. It replaced the Iranian Senate which was dissolved after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The assembly meets every six months to provide some oversight over the Supreme Leader, and to discuss succession plans. The post of supreme leader is for life, with an exception when the Assembly of Experts believes an incapacitated leader can no longer perform the function.
Ali Khamenei is almost 77, rumored to be in poor health, and has served in the post since 1989, succeeding the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomenei. If Khamenei dies over the next 8 years, his successor will be chosen by this assembly. That means they will wield enormous power in determining the future direction of Iran. There are 161 clerics (all men) running for the 86 seats. It’s an election to choose the cardinals who will then pick the pope, so to speak.
The Supreme Leader wields enormous power. He appoints half of the Guardian Council which holds veto power over the Parliament and approves candidates for election. The Supreme Leader also serves as commander in chief of the armed forces. There are rumors that after Khamenei’s death, some factions may push to make the Supreme Leader’s post an 8 or 16 year term rather than life. That is what makes this election so important, and the regime knows it, which is why the candidate lists were scrubbed of many deemed too liberal:
The disqualifications of the vast majority of reformist candidates, argues Karim Sadjadpour, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were a "reflection of the fact that the supreme leader and senior cadres of [the Revolutionary Guards] approved the nuclear deal… driven by economic expediency, not a desire to change the ideological principles of the revolution.
As he puts it, "the ideological spectrum" of those likely to win office in parliament "ranges from pitch black to dark grey. If you had a free and fair election and anyone was permitted to run, [candidates] with a more progressive, internationalist agenda would win overwhelmingly,"
Iran has high participation rates (turnout was over 66% in 2012), and a generally well run voting process. That does not mean though, that the elections are free and fair. The 2009 presidential election was probably rigged and the slate of candidates on the ballot is strictly controlled. In this election cycle, over 5,000 candidates for Parliament have been denied a spot on the ballot. Numerous candidates for the Assembly of Experts were also turned away. This includes the grandson of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. The grandson, Hassan Khomeini is among the liberal faction of Iranian clerics who participate in politics. Most observers agree the slate of candidates is skewed towards the more conservative end. The Economist estimates only 30 of 3,000 reformist candidates were approved to run for Parliament. But some of the business-oriented conservatives understand the need to maintain access to international markets and seem prepared to work with Rouhani on economic issues:
Prominent conservatives, including Ali Larijani, the speaker of parliament, have promised to support some of Mr Rohani’s economic policies. “The parliament should legislate to remove obstacles to raising production and improve the business climate,” Mr Larijani told an economic conference in Qom, the country’s religious centre, on February 14th. A large number of independent candidates might sidle up to Mr Rohani, anxious to secure the funding his government dispenses. “While a pro-Rohani parliament looks in doubt, he should at least hope for one he can work with,” says a veteran Iran hand.
That may not be enough to satisfy discontented Iranians to the left and the right. Many reformists remain bitter, not just about their electoral exclusion, but also at what they see as Mr Rohani’s failure to keep his promises. During his 2013 election campaign he held up a key, vowing to release political prisoners, including many arrested in protests that followed a disputed election in 2009. Yet they remain behind bars. Initiatives to open sports stadiums to women and execute fewer people have similarly fallen foul of conservatives. After repeated humiliations in parliament Mr Rohani has suspended political and cultural reform to focus on the economy.
Iran’s current president, the somewhat moderate Hassan Rouhani, is a candidate for the Assembly of Experts. He helped push through the nuclear deal, and this election is the best opportunity for reformist elements within Iran to attain power over a few electoral cycles. That will only happen if the turnout among Iranians in urban areas (who tend to be more liberal) is very good. There are some suggestions that social media apps, including the high-security Telegram, are being used to enhance turnout and pass around lists of preferred candidates. In the 2009 “Green Revolution” protests, social media was used to organize protesters, to mixed effect. Facebook and Twitter remain officially blocked in Iran and attempts by Rouhani’s allies to ease restrictions have been rebuffed. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the senior politicians who disputed the suspect 2009 presidential election results remain under house arrest. Their challenge to the election sparked the protests.
The leader of the liberal/reformist faction, Mohamed Reza Aref, has focused on economic issues in his campaign. Conservative elements have done the same, though they have also sought to drum up support on wedge social issues. Conservative media outlets announced an additional $600,000 bounty on Salman Rushdie’s head, the Khatami administration had suspended the official bounty in 1998. The clerical establishment, centered around the city of Qom has been largely sidelined in the process. The more liberal clerics, even those holding the highest title of marja (Grand Ayatollah) are reluctant to participate in the process openly, perhaps wary of the years of house-arrest that Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri faced. Those aligned with the Revolutionary Guard and paramilitary forces have consolidated economic and political power over the past two decades and have put forward their own hardline clerics where possible. The clerical establishment is generally more moderate than many of those aligned with the Revolutionary Guard in Iran.
President Rouhani will face re-election in 2017 and the results may impact his prospects and behavior. He enjoyed solid support from various factions because the pressure to alleviate the economic sanctions was extreme:
Sanctions thus contributed to a recalibration of political forces within the Iranian political system so critical for Rouhani’s election to power, as key segments of the conservative factions shifted towards Rouhani.
The lifting of sanctions has rendered the raison d’être behind Rouhani’s coalition irrelevant. As a result, submerged divergences over political, economic and cultural policies will become increasingly pronounced within the corridors of power in Tehran. Rouhani is now caught in a tug of war between segments of the conservative and reformist factions. While Rouhani is expected to show his support for the reformists who helped vote him into power, and who will be critical for his reelection campaign in 2017, he needs the conservatives to undertake a gradual approach to political and economic reform and to secure his own political survival. The closer he moves towards the reformists, the more he risks alienating the conservatives who will look to undermine his power and, if necessary, turn to a more suitable candidate and faction to support their interests.
One measure of the success of moderates will be turnout. A number of reports suggest liberal voters are disillusioned by the absence of liberal candidates on the ballot. If they nevertheless turn up to vote, that should lead to a better result for moderates and reformists. If you’re hoping to track individual candidates, the more moderate/reform candidates are associated with the lists named Friends of Moderation (FOM) and Pervasive Coalition of Reformists (R). Initial results should be out by the weekend, and run-offs will be held in April.